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<h2><span class="mw-headline">Overview</span></h2>

<p>Some philosophers of biology have attempted to explain the rise and fall of reductionism, vitalism, and holism throughout the history of biology. For example, these philosophers claim that the ideas of Charles Darwin ended the last remainders of teleological views from biology. Debates in these areas of philosophy of biology turn on how one views reductionism.</p>

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<p>All processes in organisms obey physical laws, the difference from inanimate processes lying in their organisation and their being subject to control by coded information. This has led some biologists and philosophers (for example, Ernst Mayr and David Hull) to return to the strictly philosophical reflections of Charles Darwin to resolve some of the problems which confronted them when they tried to employ a philosophy of science derived from classical physics. This latter, positivist approach emphasised a strict determinism (as opposed to high probability) and to the discovery of universally applicable laws, testable in the course of experiment. It was difficult for biology, beyond a basic microbiological level, to live up to these strictures - Karl Popper for example said in 1974 that &quot;<em>Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research programme</em>.&quot; Standard philosophy of science seemed to leave out a lot of what characterised living organisms - namely, a historical component in the form of an inherited genotype.</p>

<p>Biologists with philosophic interests responded, emphasising the dual nature of the living organism. On the one hand there was the genetic programme (represented in nucleic acids) - the <em>genotype</em>. On the other there was its extended body or <em>soma</em> - the <em>phenotype</em>. In accommodating the more probabilistic and non-universal nature of biological generalisations, it was a help that standard philosophy of science was in the process of accommodating similar aspects of 20th century physics.</p>

<p>Just as biology has developed as an autonomous discipline in full conversation with the other sciences, there is a great deal of work now being carried on by biologists and philosophers to develop a dedicated philosophy of biological science which, while in full conversation with all other philosophic disciplines, attempts to give answers to the real questions raised by scientific investigations in biology.</p>

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<p>While the overwhelming majority of English-speaking scholars operating under the banner of &quot;<em>philosophy of biology</em>&quot; work within the Anglo-American tradition of Analytical Philosophy, there is a stream of philosophic work in Continental philosophy which seeks to deal with issues deriving from biological science. The communication difficulties involved between these two traditions are well known, not helped by differences in language. Gerhard Vollmer is often thought of as a bridge but, despite his education and residence in Germany, he largely works in the Anglo-American tradition, particularly Pragmatism, and is famous for his development of Lorenz's and Quine's idea of Evolutionary Epistemology. On the other hand, one Harvard University scholar who has attempted to give a more Continental account of the philosophy of biology is Hans Jonas. His &quot;<em>The Phenomenon of Life</em>&quot; (New York, 1966) sets out boldly to offer an &quot;<em>existential interpretation of biological facts</em>&quot;, starting with the organism's response to stimulus and ending with man confronting the Universe, and drawing upon a detailed reading of phenomenology. This is unlikely to have much influence on mainstream philosophy of biology, but indicates, as does Vollmer's work, the current powerful influence of biological thought on philosophy. A more engaging account is given by the Chicago philosopher Marjorie Grene.</p>

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<li>Richard Lewontin </li>

<li>Ernst Mayr </li>

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